INTRODUCTION

In this issue of the Health Care
Financing Review, we focus on risk adjustment. A now-popular par t of curre n t health care jargon, risk adjustment can actually refer to a number of interre l a t e d concepts. For example, risk adjustment sometimes describes a way of accounting for diff e rences in health status among various study populations; this is also re f e rred to as case-mix adjustment. Risk adjustment can also be used for the purpose of measuring and/or predicting the health care expenditures of individuals or g roups, and applied specifically as part of a payment system. It is this latter application of the term that is the focus of this issue.
In part, this issue updates some of the re s e a rch that was previously published in the 1996 issue of the R e v i e w Volume 17, Number 3 on risk adjustment. While much has changed re g a rding the policy applications of risk adjustment-riskadjusted capitated payments are now a reality in the Medicare program, as well as in many State Medicaid prog r a m s -recent re s e a rch on risk adjustment continues to focus on model development and improvement. However, because the real world of risk-adjusted payment systems are far more common than in 1996, some of the newest work in risk adjustment is related to policy applications. This issue presents articles that touch both on recent model development work and on policy applications.
RECENT RISK-ADJUSTMENT MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Risk-adjustment models developed for the purpose of explaining/pre d i c t i n g re s o u rce use have a number of common elements. They are generally ord i n a ry least square re g ression models designed to predict total expenditures for an individual (most commonly in the following y e a r, though same year, or concurre n t models are also available). Models of this type also generally incorporate some demographic information, such as age and sex. Where models differ is in the factors (or independent variables) used to explain diff e rences in individuals' health e x p e n d i t u res, and how this information is o rganized in the classification system.
For example, most current risk-adjustment models use clinical diagnoses (in the form of the I n t e rn a t i o n a l Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification codes) as the basis for a clinical classification system. Such models depend upon the re l a t i o n s h i p between more severe and in some cases m o re numerous clinical diagnoses, and higher health care expenditures. Given that there are more than 10,000 such codes, developers of risk-adjustment models must define some way of gro u p i n g these codes in a way that makes sense to the users of the model, while maximizing p redictive power and minimizing sensitivity to coding anomalies. Some developers base their classification systems on clinical or disease-specific groupings, combining codes, for example, that pertain to various heart disorders or diabetes. Often, even these basic groups must be combined further in order to improve model p e rf o rmance; a common approach is to combine multiple clinical groups that have similar costs. Others base their gro u p i n g s on major body systems, persistence of illness, or likelihood of re c u rre n c e .
But while clinical disease codes are a common basis for risk-adjustment classification systems, they are not the only poss i b i l i t y. Curre n t l y, there are a number of risk-adjustment models that explain/predict individuals' health expenditure s using measures of functional status. The t h e o ry behind this approach is that individuals with increasing numbers of limitations in activities of daily living (ADL) are also higher users of health care serv i c e s . Instead of using diagnosis codes as the basis for classifying, ADL limitation information (gathered from all individuals or a sample population) is used. In some cases, specific ADL limitations are used as independent variables, while in other models of this type counts or hierarc h i e s of ADL limitations are developed.
In understanding risk-adjustment models developed for payment applications, the information not used in the models is almost as significant as what is. In most risk-adjustment models, the development p rocess includes decisions about the exclusion of some inform a t i o n . Sometimes those decisions are driven by the desire to improve model perf o rm a n c e or robustness. For example, if the goal of the risk-adjustment model is to pre d i c t next year expenditures using current year diagnoses, some diagnostic inform a t i o n has no predictive power or is too vague and non-specific clinically to add much to the overall models' perf o rmance. On the other hand, information which may be highly predictive of future re s o u rce use may be considered inappropriate because of incentives created, or problematic for payment purposes (for example, prior e x p e n d i t u res or the use of an individual's race). There f o re, as risk-adjustment models continue to be developed, part of the refinement process may include changes in the weight given to some information.
T h ree articles presented in this issue focus primarily on recent development/ refinement of risk-adjustment models using diagnosis information. The first of these by Ash, Ellis, Pope, Ayanian, Bates, Burstin, Iezzoni, MacKay, and Yu, provides an update of recent refinements in the DCG/HCC family of models. This a rticle focuses on prospective models for Medicare, Medicaid, and privately i n s u red populations. The authors describe the stru c t u re of the models and how they v a r y when applied to populations with differing characteristics. For example, the M e d i c a re model makes some distinctions between the aged and the disabled; the Medicaid model distinguishes among some types of eligibility. Using the authors' table of coefficients one can comp a re the relative costliness of conditions in each population.
The second article by Kronick, Gilder, D reyfus, and Lee describes a model developed for the Medicaid population. The C h ronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS) is an expansion and refinement of a system developed pre v iously for the disabled Medicaid population. The authors describe the model and examine diff e rences in the populations eligible because of disability and those eligible for Te m p o r a ry Assistance to Needy Families. Another aspect of the work is a study of year-to-year persistence of certain chronic diagnosis codes in fee-for-service (FFS) data, and the implications.
The third article by Cart e r, Bell, Dubois, Goldberg, Keeler, McAlearn e y, Post, and Rumpel re p o rts on the clinically detailed risk information system for cost (CD-RISC). The CD-RISC system re p o rted in this issue was designed and calibrated for Medicaid and private payers. Data f rom an indemnity plan and two health maintenance organizations (HMOs) were used for calibration and analysis. A l t e rnative stru c t u res are described including purely prospective models and p rospective models with selected episodes from the payment year. Comparisons among the payers are made as well as among the models.
POLICY APPLICATIONS OF RISK-ADJUSTMENT SYSTEMS
In our previously mentioned issue devoted to risk adjustment, there was little implementation experience available for policymakers to draw upon when designing risk-adjusted payment systems. At that time, lack of actual managed care data and other operational experience made implementation of risk-adjusted payments something of a leap of faith. Much has changed since 1996. HCFA implemented a form of risk adjustment based on inpatient hospital diagnoses in J a n u a ry 2000. An inpatient system was mandated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and had to be implemented within the broader program changes made by the law. Three articles in this issue focus on the implementation of M e d i c a re 's principal inpatient diagnostic cost groups (PIPDCG) system. The PIPDCG model being used is described by Pope, Ellis, Ash, Liu, Ayanian, Bates, Burstin, Iezzoni, and I n g b e r. The authors describe the development of the model and the decisions that w e re made for the Medicare version. I n g b e r, in a companion article, describes the steps HCFA took in transforming the PIPDCG risk-model coefficient estimates into relative risk factors and then, payments to managed care plans.
HMOs submitted their first year of data to HCFA for ser vice year July 1997 t h rough June 1998. Risk factors calculated using the PIPDCG system were estimated for September 1998 HMO enro l l e e s . G reenwald, Levy, and Ingber describe risk factor dif f e rences between the FFS and HMO populations in counties with significant numbers of HMO members. Focusing on individual variables in the PIPDCG model, they indicate that demographic diff e rences account for little of the obser ved diff e rences in risk factors. D i rect health status measures are re s p o nsible for the obser ved diff e rences in average risk factors between managed care and FFS beneficiaries.
Under any capitated payment system, t h e re are questions about how appro p r iately it will pay for specialized populations. One prominent issue in the implementation of risk adjustment for Medicare has been the adequacy of PIPDCG based payments for "frail" beneficiaries. This issue is of particular concern for specialized plans, such as the Program of AllInclusive Care for the Elderly (PA C E ) demonstration sites, who seek to enro l l and provide care for this vulnerable population. Current risk adjusted-payment systems, like the PIPDCG, result in pro s p e ctive payments for large, unbiased gro u p s that are extremely accurate, part i c u l a r l y m o re accurate predictions of costs for m o re specific groups of beneficiaries. The limiting factor for development and implementation of more powerful models continues, however, to be availability of re l iable data.
